[71,0] The Seventy-first Discourse : On the Philosopher. 
1 There are those who say that the philosopher should be remarkable in everything in 
any surroundings; moreover, they say that he should be very able in conversation 
with men and never keep silent or be at a loss before those in his company for lack of 
such language as will be capable of pleasing them; otherwise, they say, he who is not 
thus equipped is an ignoramus and worth but little. But I say that, though some of 
their statements are just and truthful, some are not. 2 For that the philosopher should 
in every situation be superior to all others, it seems to me they are right in demanding 
— unless they mean that he must not only know all the crafts but also, in accordance 
with the rules of the craft, produce everything better than the craftsmen, both 
building houses and making boats and working as a smith and weaving and farming. 
For example, Hippias of Elis claimed to be the wisest of the Greeks, for both at the 
Olympic Games and at the other national gatherings of the Greeks he produced 
poems of every style and speeches which he had composed of divers kinds, but he also 
displayed other products of his — his ring, his oil-flask and strigil, his mantle, and 
(p165) his girdle — boasting that he had made them all himself, displaying them to the 
Greeks as a kind of firstfruits of his wisdom.  
3 And Homer too, I venture to remark, has represented Odysseus, not merely as 
pre-eminent and judgement and in his ability to plan concerning practical matters, not 
merely as a most able speaker,  whether in a crowd or before a few or before only one 
person — yes, by Heaven, both in assembly and over the wine-cups and on occasions 
when walking with somebody on a journey — whether in the presence of king or of 
commoner, freeman or slave, no matter whether he was himself held in honour and 
recognized as king or, on the other hand, unknown and a beggar, and, moreover, alike 
when addressing either man or woman or maiden; but he also makes him 
pre-eminent for his knowledge of the art of combat, and he has even represented him as 
skilled in all such crafts as those of the joiner, the carpenter, and the shipwright. 4 For 
instance, how could Odysseus have constructed his bed by cutting off the trunk of an 
olive tree if he were not acquainted with the joiner's art?  How could he have enclosed 
his bed-chamber if he had not been acquainted with the builder's art? How could he 
have built his raft if he had not understood ship-building?  As for the operations 
connected with planting and husbandry, he obviously had shown a serious interest in 
all that from his very boyhood, since he begged his father for trees and vines;  and 
especially, since his father was a very careful and experienced farmer, it was to be 
(p167) expected that Odysseus would not be ignorant of these matters, yes, he even 
challenges Eurymachus to a contest in both reaping and ploughing.  Why, Odysseus 
claims to be acquainted also with such matters as cookery and wine-serving and all 
other departments of domestic service, matters wherein he says that those of lower 
rank serve the nobles.  
5 Very well, in these respects no doubt Hippias and Odysseus were a clever pair; but 
I say that the philosopher, while unable to know every one of the crafts — for it is 
difficult to be thoroughly proficient in the practice of even one — nevertheless could 
do everything, no matter what he might be doing, better than anybody else, even 
though from the point of view of the crafts, if he really is ever compelled to tackle 
anything of that nature, he is not superior when measured by the standard of 
craftsmanship. For this is an impossibility, that the layman should produce anything 
better than the joiner by the standard of the joiner's craft, or that one who lacks 
experience in farming should be found more expert than the farmer in performing 
any of the tasks of the farmer. 
6 Wherein, then, would the philosopher be superior? It would be in his acting, or not 
acting, advantageously, and in his knowing when to act and where and the right 
moment better than the craftsman, and also in his knowing what is possible of 
achievement. For instance, I believe that Daedalus did not build his Labyrinth in 
Crete well — entering which his fellow citizens, both male and female, met their 
death — for he did not build it justly. And besides, in abetting the malady of Pasiphaë 
he wrought not (p169) rightly; for it was not advantageous nor was it just or honourable 
to lend such aid or to invent devices for ends which were shameful and impious.  And 
even when he equipped Icarus with wings — if we are to believe the tale — I say he did 
not do well to invent this device; for he was attempting the impossible when he 
attached wings to a human being. Accordingly he wrought the death of his son. 
7 But apparently Homer too says harsh things of a certain builder among the Trojans, 
as not having done well when he built for Alexander the ships with which he sailed to 
Hellas — though he has no fault to find with him on the score of craftsmanship. For 
this is what he says: 
"Who built for Paris well-proportioned ships, 
Sources of ill",  
not lauding him for his construction of the ships, but rather censuring him much 
more severely than if, by saying that he had made the ships either slow or with some 
other defect, he had censured him for ship-building. And Homer in similar fashion 
censures also a certain huntsman and ridicules his skill, because he had acquired it 
to no good purpose, but, on the contrary, while the man knew how to shoot wild 
beasts, in warfare he could not hit any one but was useless because of his cowardice, 
and (p171) he adds that on the occasion in question Artemis did not aid him. 
8 From these illustrations, therefore, it is evident that there is need of wisdom and 
virtue as applied both to what men know and also to what they do not know; and thus 
it is that the prudent man, such as the philosopher should be, would in everything be 
superior to all the world, whether in doing any of these things or in not doing, no 
matter how he performs according to the standards of the craft. But that he will paint 
better than the painter when not himself a painter; or that he will tend the sick better 
than the physician, as measured by the standards of art, when himself not a 
physician; or that he will sing more musically than the musicians when unacquainted 
with the art of music or only slightly acquainted; or that he will show himself better 
versed than the arithmeticians in the theory of numbers, or than the surveyors in 
surveying, or than the farmers in planting, or than the pilots in piloting; or that he 
will slaughter an animal more expeditiously than the butchers, or, should it be 
necessary to cut it up, do so more expeditiously than those who have made this very 
thing their profession — such things are not to be expected. 
9 And yet a certain king of our times had the ambition to be wise in this sort of 
wisdom,  believing that he had knowledge of very many things — not, however, of 
such things as do not receive applause among men, but rather those for which it is 
possible to win a crown — I mean acting as a herald, singing to the cithara, reciting 
tragedies, wrestling, and taking part in the pancration. Besides, they say that he could 
(p173) paint and fashion statues and play the pipe, both by means of his lips and by 
tucking a skin beneath his armpits  with a view to avoiding the reproach of Athena!  
Was he not, then, a wise man?